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In recent years, several generic risk assessment (RA) tools have been developed that
can be applied to assess the incursion risk of multiple infectious animal diseases allowing
for a rapid response to a variety of newly emerging or re-emerging diseases. Although
these tools were originally developed for different purposes, they can be used to answer
similar or even identical risk questions. To explore the opportunities for cross-validation,
seven generic RA tools were used to assess the incursion risk of African swine fever
(ASF) to the Netherlands and Finland for the 2017 situation and for two hypothetical
scenarios in which ASF cases were reported in wild boar and/or domestic pigs in
Germany. The generic tools ranged from qualitative risk assessment tools to stochastic
spatial risk models but were all parameterized using the same global databases for
disease occurrence and trade in live animals and animal products. A comparison of
absolute results was not possible, because output parameters represented different
endpoints, varied from qualitative probability levels to quantitative numbers, and were
expressed in different units. Therefore, relative risks across countries and scenarios
were calculated for each tool, for the three pathways most in common (trade in live
animals, trade in animal products, and wild boar movements) and compared. For
the 2017 situation, all tools evaluated the risk to the Netherlands to be higher than
Finland for the live animal trade pathway, the risk to Finland the same or higher as
the Netherlands for the wild boar pathway, while the tools were inconclusive on the
animal products pathway. All tools agreed that the hypothetical presence of ASF in
Germany increased the risk to the Netherlands, but not to Finland. The ultimate aim of
generic RA tools is to provide risk-based evidence to support risk managers in making
informed decisions to mitigate the incursion risk of infectious animal diseases. The case
study illustrated that conclusions on the ASF risk were similar across the generic RA
tools, despite differences observed in calculated risks. Hence, it was concluded that the
cross-validation contributed to the credibility of their results.
Keywords: African swine fever, cross-validation, livestock diseases, generic model, introduction risk, model
uncertainty, risk assessment
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INTRODUCTION
Increasing globalization and international trade contribute to
rapid expansion of infectious animal diseases, as illustrated
by the recent outbreaks of bluetongue (BT), African swine
fever (ASF), lumpy skin disease (LSD), and peste des petits
ruminants (PPR) in Europe (1–3). Introduction of exotic animal
diseases into naive livestock populations can result in large-scale
epidemics with serious economic and socio-ethical impact (4–6).
Hence, preparedness is warranted to prevent, detect, and control
outbreaks of exotic animal diseases. To make decisions on risk
management of exotic animal disease threats, it is necessary to
know which animal diseases pose the highest threats and should
therefore deserve more attention.
Risk assessment is a useful tool for prioritization of diseases
with respect to their incursion risk, the results of which can
be used to assign resources for prevention and surveillance
to those diseases posing the highest risk or to identify targets
for additional research. Most commonly, risk assessments are
developed to assess the risk for a single disease and introduction
pathway. In recent years, however, several generic risk models or
frameworks have been developed that can be applied to assess the
incursion risk for multiple animal diseases (7–15). In contrast to
bespoke models, these generic risk assessment (RA) tools allow
for a more rapid response to a variety of newly emerging or
re-emerging diseases.
Generic RA tools, however, tend to have a lower resolution
in their algorithms to allow the assessment of risk over multiple
diseases that differ with respect to the species of animals
affected, transmission modes, and epidemiological and economic
impact. Furthermore, uncertainty and variability are not always
considered in much detail. To parameterize generic RA tools,
global databases are preferred, as these contain information
over multiple countries, diseases, and/or introduction pathways.
Application of results from generic RA tools vary from a
rapid response to new emergencies to horizon scanning and
prioritization of diseases, pathways, or regions.
A shared problem of generic tools with bespoke models is
the validation of their results. Most import risk assessments
estimate the probability of rare events occurring in an ever-
changing world, leaving the use of a long range of historical data
for this purpose useless. Validation of import risk assessments
is, nevertheless, an important step in their development to
ensure the plausibility of results. Sensitivity analysis to address
parameter uncertainty by varying the values of uncertain input
parameters in a plausible range contributes to the internal
validation of risk assessments (16, 17). With several generic RA
tools having been developed in recent years in Europe that all can
be used to assess the incursion risk of notifiable animal diseases
such as ASF, LSD, and BT, opportunities arise to address model
uncertainty by comparing results obtained with different tools.
The objective of this study was to explore the opportunities for
cross-validation of generic RA tools, where cross-validation was
defined as the validation of model results by comparing them
with results of other models that addressed the same question.
ASF was selected as a case study given its rapid spread in Europe
in recent years (18–20).
ASF is a viral disease of pigs and wild boar caused by the
ASF virus, the only member of the family Asfarviridae (21–23).
ASF virus (genotype 2) was introduced into the Caucasus region
in 2007 and has subsequently spread into Belarus, Russia and
Ukraine and then to the European Union in 2014 with infection
having been reported from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Belgium in
recent years (2, 3). Prevention of ASF introduction is a high
priority for European countries still free from the disease as
introduction of the disease can have severe consequences for
the domestic pig sector and the wild boar population due to
an extremely high case fatality rate (up to 100%) (24). Rigorous
measures are needed to control the disease including culling of
infected herds and movement bans, and there are difficulties in
eradicating the disease once it has established itself in the wild
boar population (24, 25). There is currently no vaccine available
against ASF infection and infection continues to spread through
various pathways, including movement of infected wild boar and
human mediated routes.
Results of risk assessment studies are an important input into
risk management decisions to prevent ASF spread to new regions
and several bespoke models for ASF have been developed in the
last decade (26–31). All generic RA tools of this study can also be
used to assess the ASF incursion risk with the major advantage
that results can easily be updated when outbreaks are reported
from new regions in Europe. However, because of their generic
character, validation is an even more essential step to ensure
plausibility of results.
To cross-validate the generic RA tools of this study, all tools
were used to assess the incursion risk of ASF to two European
countries, the Netherlands and Finland. These countries were
chosen because of their opposite risk profiles when considering
their ASF risk, with the Netherlands being a trading country
not only exporting millions of pigs annually, but also importing
over a million of live pigs each year (32), whereas Finland
has hardly any international trade in live pigs (33). Finland,
on the contrary, was geographically much closer to observed
outbreaks of ASF in Europe at the time this study was
initiated (before the ASF outbreaks in wild boar in Belgium in
September 2018).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Definitions
Although an assessment of the incursion risk would ideally
address both the probability of incursion of disease and
its subsequent consequences, not all generic RA tools of
this study had incorporated a consequence assessment.
Therefore, in this study incursion risk is used as a generic
term to indicate any metric to estimate the risk of exotic
diseases entering a new territory, varying from entry only
to a full risk assessment including epidemiological and
economic consequences.
Regarding the probability of incursion, four separate steps
are distinguished in this study. In the entry step the probability
that an infectious agent enters a new territory (hereafter called:
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TABLE 1 | Brief outline of seven generic RA tools.
RA tool Objective Prioritization Data
available
in tool
Number of
diseases in
tool
Number of
pathways in
tool
Variability/
uncertainty
included
Software Developer More
information
SPARE Early warning of
disease incursion risks
Target areas Yes 4 5 None R APHA, UK (14, 35)
COMPARE Identification of
hotspots for
risk-based surveillance
Target areas,
pathways
No 3 5 Variability R APHA, UK (15, 36–38)
RRAT Identification of high
priority exotic
notifiable diseases
Pathways,
diseases
Yes 10 3 None R, SQLite WBVR, NL (39)
MINTRISK Comparison and
prioritization of
vector-borne diseases
Target areas,
diseases
No NAa NAb Uncertainty C#, Visual
Studio
WBVR, NL (10, 11, 40, 41)
IDM Identification of high
priority exotic
notifiable diseases
Diseases Yes 34 7 None Excel Defra, UK (8, 11)
NORA Rapid risk assessment
to respond to new
disease events
Pathways No NAa 9 None Excel Ruokavirasto,
FI
(12)
SVARRA Rapid risk assessment
to respond to new
disease events
Pathways No NAa 8 Uncertainty Word, Excel SVA, SE (11)
aThese tools have no underlying database with disease-specific data and can evaluate any disease.
bMINTRISK can evaluate any pathway.
target area) by any pathway is evaluated, without assessing
subsequent exposure of susceptible animals in the target area
via this pathway. In the exposure step the probability that a
susceptible native host animal in the target area is exposed to
the infectious agent is evaluated given its entry into the target
area, without assessing the probability that such exposure would
result in infection. In the first infection step the probability
that contact with the infectious agent results in infection
of a first native host in the target area (= index case) is
evaluated given its entry into the target area and exposure
of the host animal. In the establishment step the probability
that the infectious agent will start spreading in the target
area is evaluated given it has entered the target area and
resulted in a first infection of native host animals. Establishment
is an important step when evaluating the incursion risk of
vector-borne diseases, where an infection of a native host
animal can be a dead-end if, e.g., no competent vectors are
present in the target area or if climatic conditions impede
subsequent transmission.
Consequences of disease incursion have been separated into
epidemiological and economic consequences. Epidemiological
consequences have been defined as the expected spread of the
infectious agent in the native (susceptible) population in the
target area or further geographical spread from the target
area to new regions, considering, e.g., the epidemic size and
geographic area affected. Economic consequences have been
defined as the expected monetary losses resulting from an
outbreak with the infectious agent in the target area due to, e.g.,
morbidity and mortality, production losses, control measures
and trade restrictions.
Generic Risk Assessment Tools
Seven generic RA tools, all developed by the G-RAID1
consortium (34), were included in the cross-validation study.
Selection criteria for inclusion were (i) the tool was developed
to assess the incursion risk of multiple diseases rather than
a single disease, and (ii) the tool focused on the veterinary
risk of animal diseases rather than public health. Although all
seven tools can be used to address the incursion risk of exotic
animal diseases, they were originally developed for different
purposes ranging from immediate response to new disease
events to prioritization of diseases and horizon scanning. As
a consequence, input, algorithms, and endpoints of the tools
differed. The seven generic RA tools included two quantitative
tools (SPARE, COMPARE), four semi-quantitative tools (RRAT,
MINTRISK, IDM, NORA) and one qualitative tool (SVARRA).
A brief overview of all tools is given in Table 1. More details are
available in Supplementary Material 1.
All seven RA tools were built to be flexible with respect to
the animal diseases to be evaluated, although MINTRISK was
primarily designed to assess the risk of vector-borne diseases. The
total number of diseases evaluated so far with each of the tools
varies greatly, as does the level of resources (expertise, data, time)
needed to complete a risk assessment. For all tools, the assessment
is less rapid if the disease has not been evaluated before with the
tool, because additional data collection and parameterization is
required. The RRAT and the IDM tool have the data required
to perform the risk assessment readily available in the tool for
1Generic approaches for Risk Assessment of Infectious animal Disease
introduction.
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TABLE 2 | Introduction pathways embedded in each of the generic RA tools.
PATHWAY SPARE COMPARE RRAT MINTRISKa IDM NORA SVARRA
Live animals X X X X X X X
Products of animal origin X X X X X X
Germplasm X X X X
Vectors X X X X X
Wildlife X X X X X X
Human travel X X X X
Transport X X X
Laboratory material and samples X
Feed and bedding X X
Airborne spread X
aMINTRISK can deal with any pathway, but none are embedded in the tool; these are the pathways that were evaluated for the ASF case study.
FIGURE 1 | Outline of the steps involved in assessing disease incursion risks indicating the entirety of the generic RA tools.
a multitude of diseases. SPARE and COMPARE have only been
parameterized for a few diseases, although the data available on
disease prevalence worldwide in these tools can theoretically be
used to assess the risk of any OIE-listed disease. MINTRISK,
NORA, and SVARRA come mostly without underlying databases
and have to be filled by the risk assessor.
The tools also differ widely with respect to the number of
introduction pathways that can be evaluated (Table 2). Legal
trade in live animals and imports of products of animal origin
are considered by each tool, although these pathways were
not always consistently defined across the tools. For example,
some tools consider trade in livestock animals only, whereas
other tools also consider trade in pets and exotic animals.
Most tools also address windborne vector spread and wild
animal dispersion including migratory birds. All tools but
MINTRISK have predefined pathways built in. MINTRISK asks
the risk assessor to define relevant pathways for the disease
considered, either related to vertebrate host animals and their
products, vectors, or humans. In general, the tools with relatively
uncomplicated algorithms, such as the qualitative tool SVARRA
and the semi-quantitative tools IDM and MINTRISK, are most
flexible to include additional pathways.
The outline of all seven generic RA tools is primarily based
on the OIE import risk assessment framework (42). However, the
RA tools differ widely with respect to the steps that are included
to assess the disease incursion risk (Figure 1). Endpoints of
the tools differ alike. MINTRISK is the most complete tool
considering entry up to establishment, and epidemiological and
economic consequences. SPARE on the contrary only considers
entry. All tools use the basic principles of the Binomial model
(43) to assess entry of pathogens into new areas, combining
information on pathway numbers (N) with probabilities of
infection (p) based on prevalence levels. All tools that evaluate
epidemiological consequences (COMPARE, MINTRISK, IDM)
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FIGURE 2 | ASF cases in domestic pigs and wild boar in 2017 as reported to the OIE (2). Target countries of the case study (the Netherlands and Finland) have been
colored yellow. Inset: location of hypothetical ASF cases in Germany.
do so by estimating the basic reproductive number R0 (44) and
implementing it into their model calculations.
Only a few of the generic RA tools have embedded uncertainty
and/or variability in their risk assessment. COMPARE is the
only tool addressing variability in calculating the incursion risk
using stochastic calculations, including primarily the variability
in disease prevalence in traded animals/products but also
variability in other disease parameters. MINTRISK and SVARRA
are the only tools that explicitly ask the risk assessor for
his/her uncertainty in estimating the input parameter values,
and only MINTRISK uses stochastic simulation to address this
uncertainty. NORA also acknowledges that risk assessors cannot
be expected to know everything and offers the “I don’t know”
option in answering the questions. This uncertainty is reported
in the results of the tool by counting the number of questions
that were given this answer. Despite the fact that uncertainty
is not embedded in the other RA tools, most of them offer the
opportunity to consider uncertainty via scenario analysis.
Risk Question and Scenarios
To explore the opportunities for cross-validation of the generic
RA tools, all seven tools were used to assess the risk for a selected
case study considering several African swine fever scenarios. The
risk question considered the ASF virus strain responsible for
European cases in 2017 as the hazard and was formulated as:
Given the history of ASF cases reported in Europe in 2017, as
well as trade patterns in 2017, what is the predicted incursion
risk of ASF to (a) the Netherlands and (b) Finland from any
country where the virus strain circulates? In addition, the same
question was answered considering two hypothetical scenarios
in which ASF cases were reported in Germany. In the first
hypothetical scenario (HS1), it was assumed that on 30/12/2017
10 separate cases of wild boar found dead, infected with ASF,
were reported from the Munster region of Germany at a distance
of ∼50 km from the Dutch border (Figure 2). In the second
hypothetical scenario (HS2), it was assumed that on 30/12/2017,
as per scenario HS1, ten separate cases of ASF in wild boar were
reported from the Munster region of Germany, and that one
outbreak on a single commercial mixed (breeding and fattening)
farm had been reported in the same region with 2,500 pigs on it,
18 of which were found infected and all 2,500 were immediately
culled (Figure 2). In both hypothetical scenarios, the history of
ASF outbreaks and reported trade patterns were assumed to be
the same as in the 2017 scenario. Furthermore, hypothetical ASF
cases in scenarios HS1 and HS2 were assumed to behave in a
similar way to the other cases in Europe in 2017 with regards to
characteristics such as infectious period and transmission rate.
Input Data for the African Swine Fever
Case Study
The majority of the data required for the generic RA tools can
be broken down into four categories: (1) pathway movements
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from source areas to the target area; (2) disease prevalence
in source areas; (3) susceptible animals in the target area;
and (4) disease-specific parameters. For the case study, input
data used by the tools were harmonized wherever possible
to ensure that differences in results would result from model
uncertainty rather than input parameter uncertainty. An
overview of input data shared between the tools is available in
Supplementary Material 2.
Pathway Movements
Data on pathway movements are relevant to the entry stage
of the risk assessment and focus on how many units (animals,
products etc.) will reach the target area from different source
areas, regardless of whether or not they are infected. All generic
RA tools derive data on pathway movements predominantly
from global databases on international trade. For the legal trade
pathways, all of the tools can use one or more of TRACES (45),
Comext (33), or Comtrade (46). For movement of wild animals
and illegal trade, global datasets are obviously not possible to
obtain. However, most tools incorporate global datasets of travel
statistics (47) or population abundance maps in order to either
model or estimate a score for how much illegal trade or wild
animal movements are to be expected.
For the case study, all of the generic RA tools used Comext
trade data for 2017 (33) to assess the numbers of animals,
products (including germplasm and laboratory material), and
travelers entering the Netherlands and Finland. However, the
selection of CN codes (Combined Nomenclature) (48, 49)
included in the tools depended on how pathways were defined
and was not the same across all tools, especially when considering
the legal trade in animal products. Population abundance maps
(50) were used to either model or estimate a score for how
many wild boarmovements were to be expected. The quantitative
tools (SPARE, COMPARE) applied mechanistic approaches (in
which a complex problem is broken down to the underlying
mechanisms) to determine the movement of wild boars and
harmonized the parameters within these tools as far as possible,
e.g., percentage of wild boars that move long distances and how
far they move.
Disease Prevalence
Data on disease prevalence are also relevant to the entry stage of
the risk assessment and are used to estimate the probability that
animals/products are infected. Disease prevalence in source areas
is primarily based on information on disease occurrence derived
from the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS)
(2), although Empres-i (51) and the Animal Disease Notification
System (ADNS) (52) are also used across the tools. Furthermore,
the more qualitative tools might also include information derived
from reports and mailings from the European Commission.
For the case study, all generic RA tools were fed with data
from WAHIS (2) on the number of ASF outbreaks and the
number of cases by species (domestic pigs, wild boar) on the
country level for 2017 and previous years. An overview of ASF
cases reported to OIE in 2017 is given in Figure 2. To estimate
disease prevalence in the source countries, information on pig
and wild boar populations in those countries were also derived
from WAHIS. The RA tools used, however, different approaches
to convert the WAHIS data into disease prevalence estimates.
Whereas some of them included all historical data available from
the OIE website, others only considered information on disease
outbreaks in a recent period (e.g., a 1-year period or the high-
risk period, i.e., the period from introduction of disease into an
area until its detection). Furthermore, some tools had built-in
algorithms to correct for non-reporting or underreporting, or to
include a probability of disease presence despite current absence,
whereas other tools based their prevalence estimates on the actual
situation reported to OIE only. In addition, the more qualitative
tools had the ability to include additional information derived
from, e.g., ADNS and reports and mailings from the European
Commission, especially when assessing the infection probabilities
of wild boar populations.
Susceptible Animals
Data on susceptible animals relate to the probabilities of disease
transmission to susceptible populations in the target area. For
this category of data input, more variation is observed between
the seven tools due to contrasting choices made to model contact
between susceptible animals and infected animals/products.
Whereas some tools include detailed data on number of animals
and farms or livestock densities in the target area derived from
global databases such as WAHIS (2) and FAOSTAT (53), other
tools distinguish between different farm types based on size and
biosecurity level or include information on disease susceptibility
only. One of the tools, SPARE, has not included information
on susceptible animals in the target area at all, because it only
evaluates entry of the pathogen, and not subsequent exposure
or infection.
As a result, harmonization of data on susceptible animals in
the Netherlands and Finland was difficult. COMPARE used maps
on wild boar abundance (50), whereas most tools did not need
data at this spatial scale and used data on wild boar presence and
abundance from Dutch and Finnish sources (54–56).
Disease-Specific Parameters
The category of disease-specific input parameters includes all
parameters specific to the disease, such as duration of the latent
and infectious period, transmission probabilities, severity of
clinical signs, test sensitivities, and decay rates in products. For
this category of data input, the tools differ in whether and how
they incorporate these parameters; however, all of them primarily
used published literature and expert opinion to find relevant
parameter values.
For the case study, disease-specific parameters were sourced
individually by each tool from published literature [e.g., (57–
61)] and expert opinion. Parameter values were shared to enable
harmonization of input data over the RA tools if the same input
parameters were used (Supplementary Material 2).
Comparison of Results
Although ideally both the probability of incursion of disease
and its consequences are evaluated in assessing the incursion
risk of exotic diseases, results of the generic RA tools for the
ASF case study could only be compared for the probability
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TABLE 3 | Risk of ASF incursion as evaluated by the seven generic RA tools.
RA tool Endpoint Output type Output parameter
SPARE Entry Quantitative Number of entries per year
COMPARE First infection Quantitative Annual probability
RRAT First infection Semi-quantitative Risk score (from 0 to 1)
MINTRISK Establishment Semi-quantitative Annual rate
IDM Exposure Semi-quantitative Risk score (from 0 to 60)
NORA First infection Semi-quantitative Risk score (from 0 to 1)
SVARRA Exposure Qualitative Qualitative probability level
of incursion, because consequences were only assessed by
some tools. A comparison of absolute results obtained by
the seven generic RA tools was not possible though, because
endpoints for the probability of incursion varied from entry
to establishment (Table 3). In addition, the tools had different
output parameters (Table 3) and evaluated different numbers and
types of introduction pathways (Table 2). All tools assessed the
ASF risk from legal trade in live animals and six out of seven
tools assessed trade in animal products (all but MINTRISK)
and wild boar movements (all but RRAT). Therefore, for each
tool, relative risks were calculated by country and scenario for
the three pathways most in common to enable comparison of
results. These were compared to see if the tools agreed on the
directions and magnitudes of the relative risks resulting in a
similar prioritization of countries and scenarios. In addition the
pathways within each RA tool were compared against each other
to identify the pathways contributing most to the ASF risk to the
Netherlands and Finland.
The relative risk across the two countries (RRcij ) for each tool
i was calculated for each pathway j as:
RRcij = RNLDij/RFINij
where RNLDij is the calculated risk by tool i to the Netherlands for
pathway j and RFINij the calculated risk by tool i to Finland for
pathway j. Calculations were done for the baseline scenario (2017
situation) only.
Relative risks across scenarios (RRHS1ijk and RRHS2ijk ) for each
tool i were calculated for each pathway j and each country k as:
RRHS1ijk = RHS1ijk/RBaseijk and RRHS2ijk = RHS2ijk/RBaseijk
where RBaseijk is the calculated risk by tool i for pathway j and
country k for the baseline scenario (2017 situation), RHS1ijk is the
calculated risk by tool i for pathway j and country k for the first
hypothetical scenario (ASF in wild boar in Germany), and RHS2ijk
is the calculated risk by tool i for pathway j and country k for
the second hypothetical scenario (ASF in wild boar and domestic
pigs in Germany).
In order to calculate relative risks for the qualitative RA
tool SVARRA, qualitative probability levels were converted to
numerical values using a log-scale, where negligible = 1, very
low = 10, low = 100, etc. The in-between probability level
negligible/very low was given a numerical value of
√
10. All other
FIGURE 3 | Relative risk of introducing ASF into the Netherlands compared to
Finland in the baseline scenario (2017 situation) by (A) trade in live animals, (B)
trade in animal products, and (C) movement of wild boar. A relative risk above
1 (bold line) denotes the Netherlands has a higher risk than Finland, while a
relative risk below 1 denotes Finland has a higher risk. Please note the different
scales used on the y-axes.
RA tools provided numerical results, either representing absolute
risk estimates or semi-quantitative risk scores (see Table 3),
making it possible to calculate relative risks. The only exceptions
were scenarios resulting in a negligible or zero result. To enable
the calculation of relative risks, negligible and zero results were
set equal to 10−10, based on the lowest results that were calculated
by the tools (7 × 10−10 for the risk of the live animal trade
pathway to Finland as calculated by RRAT).
RESULTS
Relative Risks Across Countries
For each of the generic RA tools, the ASF incursion risk to the
Netherlands was compared to Finland for the pathways (a) trade
in live animals, (b) trade in animal products, and (c) wild boar
movements. Results for the baseline scenario (2017 situation) are
given in Figure 3. A calculated relative risk above 1 indicates
that the ASF risk was higher to the Netherlands than Finland.
Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www.frontiersin.org 7 February 2020 | Volume 7 | Article 56
de Vos et al. Cross-Validation of Generic RA Tools
FIGURE 4 | Relative risk of introducing ASF into (A) the Netherlands and (B) Finland in the hypothetical scenario with ASF reported in wild boar in Germany (HS1) and
(C) the Netherlands and (D) Finland with ASF reported in wild boar and domestic pigs in Germany (HS2) compared to the baseline scenario (2017 situation). A relative
risk of 1 (bold line) denotes no differences in risks among the scenarios. Please note the different scales used on the y-axes.
From Figure 3A it can be seen that, for each of the RA tools,
the evaluated risk of the live animal trade pathway was higher to
the Netherlands than Finland. In particular SPARE, COMPARE,
RRAT and NORA predicted a much higher risk (i.e., over 107
times higher).
Six of the seven RA tools evaluated the animal products
pathway (MINTRISK did not) (Figure 3B). COMPARE, RRAT,
and NORA predicted a higher incursion risk to the Netherlands
than Finland for this pathway, although differences in risks were
much smaller than for the live animal trade pathway. IDM
and SVARRA predicted an equivalent risk for both countries,
whereas SPARE uniquely predicted that the risk was lower to the
Netherlands than Finland.
Again, six of the seven RA tools evaluated the wild boar
pathway (RRAT did not) (Figure 3C). COMPARE and NORA
predicted an equivalent, very low to negligible incursion risk
resulting from this pathway to both countries. All other tools had
a relative risk below 1, which indicates that the predicted ASF risk
was higher to Finland than the Netherlands.
Relative Risks Across Scenarios
For each of the generic RA tools, the ASF incursion risk of both
hypothetical scenarios was compared to the baseline scenario.
Results for the Netherlands and Finland are given in Figure 4.
A calculated relative risk above 1 indicates that the ASF risk was
higher in the hypothetical scenario than in the baseline scenario.
The hypothetical situation in which ASF cases were reported
in wild boar in Germany (HS1) resulted in an increased risk to
the Netherlands compared to the baseline scenario, especially
for the wild boar pathway. In particular SPARE and COMPARE
predicted a much higher risk (i.e., over 103 times higher). NORA
was the only tool of those evaluating the wild boar pathway
that did not predict an increased risk for this pathway in HS1
to the Netherlands. The addition of a single ASF outbreak at a
domestic pig farm (HS2) resulted in a slightly increased risk to
the Netherlands for the live animal trade pathway compared to
HS1 for MINTRISK, IDM and NORA, and a slightly increased
risk for both the live animal trade pathway and the animal
products pathway for SPARE, COMPARE and RRAT. SVARRA
indicated that the ASF outbreak at a domestic farm in Germany
(HS2) did not further increase the ASF risk to the Netherlands
compared to HS1.
Most RA tools agreed that the presence of ASF in wild boar in
Germany (HS1) did not increase the risk to Finland compared
to the baseline scenario. Only IDM and NORA predicted a
slightly increased risk for the live animal trade pathway and
the animal products pathway, respectively. The addition of a
single ASF outbreak at a domestic pig farm (HS2) resulted in
a slightly increased risk to Finland for the live animal trade
pathway compared to HS1 for SPARE and IDM, and a slightly
increased risk for the animal products pathway for SPARE,
COMPARE, and RRAT. MINTRISK and SVARRA indicated
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TABLE 4 | Pathways contributing most to the ASF incursion risk for each toola per country and scenario (indicated in red)b.
RA TOOL Scenario The Netherlands Finland
Live animals Animal products Wild boar Live animals Animal products Wild boar
COMPARE Baseline
HS1
HS2
RRAT Baseline
HS1
HS2
MINTRISK Baseline
HS1
HS2
NORAc Baseline
HS1
HS2
SVARRAd Baseline
HS1
HS2
a It was not possible to compare pathways in the SPARE and IDM tools.
bThe gray cells indicate that this pathway was not evaluated by the tool.
c In NORA, the human travel pathway had the highest risk for Finland in all three scenarios; the animal products pathway ranked second.
dEqual contribution of several pathways in one scenario.
that the presence of ASF in wild boar and/or domestic pigs in
Germany did not increase the ASF risk to Finland compared to
the baseline scenario.
Pathway Contribution
Table 4 presents an overview of the three most commonly
investigated pathways in the tools (i.e., trade in live animals,
trade in animal products and wild boar movements), indicating
the pathway that contributed most to the ASF incursion risk
to the Netherlands and Finland in the baseline scenario and
the two hypothetical scenarios. Results for SPARE and IDM are
not included here, because a relative comparison of estimated
pathway risks was not possible for these tools. In SPARE the
units in which the risks are expressed differ over the pathways
being numbers of infected animals for the live animal trade
and wild boar pathway and numbers of infected kilograms for
the animal products pathway (Supplementary Material 3). In
IDM the semi-quantitative risk scores assigned to each of the
pathways have not been scaled to allow for a comparison between
the pathways.
Overall, most tools agreed that (when considered) animal
products constituted the highest risk to Finland for all three
scenarios, and to the Netherlands in the baseline scenario. For
both hypothetical scenarios the animal products pathway was
still predicted to have the highest risk to the Netherlands by
COMPARE and RRAT. However, NORA indicated a change in
risk such that trade in live animals became the pathway with the
highest risk for ASF incursion when the disease was assumed to
be present in Germany. Under all scenarios the SVARRA tool
did not have a single pathway constituting the highest risk to the
Netherlands resulting from the lack of resolution available with a
qualitative approach when risk estimates are close. The presence
of ASF in Germany resulted in an increased risk estimate for the
wild boar pathway in SVARRA, such that all three pathways had
an equal risk level in the hypothetical scenarios. MINTRISK was
the only tool not to consider animal products and concluded that
from those that were included (trade in live animals and wild
boar movements), wild boar was the pathway associated with the
highest risk, for both the Netherlands and Finland.
Some of the tools included more pathways than the three
investigated here (Table 2). When taking into account these
additional pathways, only in NORA the pathway ranking top for
Finland was changed from trade in animal products to human
travel for all three scenarios (Supplementary Material 3).
DISCUSSION
Cross-Validation Based on the ASF Case
Study
Validation of generic RA tools is a challenging task for which
no gold standard is available. In this study, we explored
the opportunity to cross-validate seven generic RA tools by
universally applying them to a predefined case study on the
incursion risk of ASF. Comparison of the absolute results
from the tools was not possible for several reasons, including
their differing objectives, endpoints, outputs, and risk pathways
considered. However, by comparing relative risks it was possible
to cross-validate the generic RA tools across the different
pathways, between the two countries of interest (Netherlands and
Finland) and between the three scenarios that were evaluated.
In general, the tools agreed on the ranking of the target
countries for the pathways evaluated, although the magnitude
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of relative risks calculated differed widely (Figure 3). All of
the tools estimated that the live animal trade pathway posed
a (much) higher risk to the Netherlands than Finland in the
baseline scenario (2017 situation). The large differences in risk
relate to the extremely low or even negligible incursion risk of
trade in live animals to Finland rather than to a high risk to
the Netherlands (absolute results for each tool are provided in
Supplementary Material 3). In 2017, only 300 live pigs were
transported to Finland compared to 1.9 million pigs to the
Netherlands (33). All of the tools which included the animal
products pathway agreed that the risk of this pathway to the
Netherlands was higher than or equal to Finland in the baseline
scenario with the exception of SPARE. Thismight be explained by
the relatively large amount of pork and pork products imported
by Finland from Estonia (33) and SPARE being the only tool
not considering exposure, first infection or establishment, having
entry as an endpoint. Hence, these imports from Estonia, which
is an ASF-infected country, contributed largely to the estimated
incursion risk by SPARE. For the wild boar pathway, all of the
tools including this pathway agreed that the risk to Finland was
higher than or equal to the Netherlands, although differences in
risks between the countries were less pronounced than for the
live animal trade pathway. SPARE calculated a high relative risk
of this pathway to Finland if compared to the other tools, which
again might be explained by the fact that this tool had entry as an
endpoint. A lot of uncertainty was included in the predictions for
the wild boar pathway, especially in the estimated risk to Finland,
due to uncertainty on the presence of wild boar in the border
region of Finland and Russia and the spatial distribution of ASF
cases in wild boar in Russia.
When comparing the hypothetical scenarios to the baseline all
of the RA tools indicated an increased risk to the Netherlands due
to presence of ASF in wild boar and/or domestic pigs in Germany,
especially for the wild boar pathway, whereas most tools agreed
that the risk to Finland would stay at the same level or increase
slightly. However, differences were observed between the tools on
the extent to which the live animal trade pathway contributed to
the increased risk to the Netherlands.
Investigating the ranking of risk pathways, comparisons could
only be made for five of the seven tools, as the risk estimates
for individual pathways in SPARE and IDM were given in
different units and at a different scale, respectively. Comparisons
of rankings were further complicated by the different numbers
and types of pathways evaluated by each of the tools. Although
Table 4 indicates that most tools agreed that the animal products
pathway constituted the highest risk to both countries in the
baseline scenario, this is actually only true for three out of
the five tools that could be compared (COMPARE, RRAT, and
SVARRA), with MINTRISK not having evaluated this pathway
and NORA estimating a higher risk for the human travel pathway
for Finland (Supplementary Material 3). In NORA, the human
travel pathway includes the risk of ASF incursion via animal
products carried for own consumption. Bringing products from
Estonia was assumed to be common practice in Finland due to
easy accessibility of wild boar products in Estonia at low prices,
contributing largely to the high estimate of the risk of the human
travel pathway to Finland. Lastly, it should be noted that SVARRA
evaluated the risk of the live animal trade pathway equal to the
animal products pathway for the Netherlands.
Differences in calculated relative risks over countries and
scenarios between the tools can be largely explained from (i)
differences in endpoints considered when evaluating the risk of
ASF incursion, (ii) different quantitative scales on which the
risk estimates were scored, and (iii) differences in the definition
of pathways.
SPARE was the only tool that evaluated the entry of ASF into
the target area without considering exposure or first infection of
native animals. This has probably contributed to the differences
observed between SPARE and the other RA tools when evaluating
the relative risk from the animal products and the wild boar
pathways to the Netherlands compared to Finland in the baseline
scenario (Figure 3). No such differences between SPARE and the
other tools were observed for the live animal trade pathway,
where entry is more directly linked to exposure, first infection
and establishment if animals are imported for life.
All tools but SVARRA produced numbers to express the
incursion risk of ASF to the Netherlands and Finland, although
the quantitative scales differed among the tools (see Table 3).
Absolute results from SPARE and MINTRISK could in theory
run from zero to infinity, even though most estimates were
below 1 given the relatively low risk of disease incursion. Again,
as SPARE evaluated entry rather than exposure, first infection
or establishment, its results were relatively high for the animal
products pathway (Supplementary Material 3). Absolute results
from COMPARE, RRAT and NORA were bounded by 0 and 1.
Thus, for all these five tools, whether absolute results were given
from 0 to 1 or from 0 to infinity, calculated relative risks could run
from zero to infinity and some tools indeed had extremely high
relative risk scores (Figures 3, 4), especially if the denominator
was estimated to be negligible or zero. Results from IDM, on
the contrary, are semi-quantitative risk scores ranging from 0
to 60 for the overall risk, with maximum scores for individual
pathways being < 60. As risk scores of IDM are discrete values
(at an interval of 0.5), calculated relative risks were in general
relatively low compared to those from other tools. Qualitative
probability levels from SVARRAwere converted into quantitative
numbers using a log10 scale. Although this would have allowed
the calculated relative risks to vary from 10−4 to 104 with a
scale consisting of five levels (ranging from very low to very
high), the relative risks estimated by SVARRA never exceeded
10, since differences in risk were always equal to or less than one
probability level.
Differences in calculated relative risks over countries and
scenarios might also have originated from how pathways were
defined in the tools. Trade in live animals was most uniformly
defined, although some tools (SPARE, RRAT, IDM) not only
included trade in domestic livestock animals, but also trade in
horses, pets, and exotic mammals and birds. This will, however,
not have resulted in differences for the ASF risk, since the only
animals affected by ASF are porcine species (including wild boar
and warthogs) (21, 22, 59, 62). Trade in animal products differed
to a larger extent, with some tools only including pork and pork
products for human consumption (SPARE, COMPARE), whereas
other tools also included other products derived from slaughtered
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pigs, such as hides and bristles (RRAT, IDM). In IDM, NORA
and SVARRA, this pathway even included illegal trade, whereas
that was separated out in the other tools. The different definitions
of the animal products pathway might have lead to different
estimates of the absolute incursion risk of this pathway by the
different tools, especially from source countries from which
imports of fresh and frozen meat are not allowed. Also when
considering the relative risks, the generic tools agreed least on
the animal products pathway (Figure 3). Although the wild
boar pathway was uniformly defined among the tools to be the
incursion of ASF due to wild boar movements, this pathway was
modeled differently among the tools, with some tools estimating
the risk based on geographic proximity of infected wild boar
populations at the country level (SPARE, MINTRISK, IDM),
whereas one tool modeled the spatial distribution of wild boar
and their movements based on habitat suitability (COMPARE).
MINTRISK is the only tool in which pathways are not
predefined. The risk assessor can thus decide upon the pathways
to include in the risk assessment and will preferably include
those that are deemed most important given the transmission
mechanisms of the disease. Although trade in animal products
was considered an important route for ASF, the risk assessors
decided not to include it because of lack of information on
whether animal products were derived from domestic pigs or
wild boar. The other tools did not offer the opportunity to
distinguish between products from domestic pigs and wild boar
and included both in the animal products pathway. The asset
of having user-defined pathways in MINTRISK thus created
another level of uncertainty in the results of the risk assessment
which is beyond parameter and model uncertainty.
Differences in (implicit) modeling assumptions between the
generic RA tools might have further contributed to the observed
differences in the evaluated ASF incursion risk between the tools,
although it is difficult to predict their impact on the calculated
relative risks. For instance, the level of detail at which contact
with susceptible animals in the target area was modeled varied
widely among the tools, with some of them only using an
overall probability estimate (RRAT, MINTRISK, IDM, NORA),
while others explicitly modeled how different animal species
(COMPARE) or livestock farms (SVARRA) would be exposed.
Another example is that RRAT and NORA used worst case
assumptions to evaluate the ASF incursion risk whereas the other
tools used more realistic assumptions. Furthermore, the time
period for which the risk assessment was performed differed
among the tools. Most tools used an annual timescale and thus
assessed the ASF incursion risk using data from a 1-year period
(here: 2017). However, NORA and SVARRA considered a 3-
month period to account for the high-risk period of newly
infected territories, when no trade restrictions are in force yet. For
some tools, decisions on these issues were embedded in themodel
structure, and could thus be attributed to model uncertainty,
whereas for other tools, decisions were taken by the risk assessor
performing the ASF case study.
The ultimate aim of these generic RA tools is to provide risk-
based evidence to support risk managers in making informed
decisions on reducing the incursion risk of infectious animal
diseases by, e.g., preventive actions, targeted surveillance, and
contingency planning. While absolute risk estimates contribute
to the decision on whether any preventive actions are required
or not, relative risk estimates are useful for prioritization of
risk management options. Prioritization of diseases, pathways
and/or target areas is an important output of all seven
generic RA tools in this study (Table 1). Comparing the
results of the tools for the ASF case study indicated that
the tools largely agreed upon the direction of the relative
risks and thus on prioritization of countries and scenarios.
All tools concluded that the ASF risk of trade in live animals
was lower to Finland than the Netherlands in the baseline
scenario (2017), and that the risk of wild boar movements
to Finland was equal to or higher than the Netherlands.
Furthermore, all tools concluded that the presence of ASF in
Germany (hypothetical scenarios) had little or no impact on
the ASF risk to Finland, but did increase the ASF risk to
the Netherlands. Thus, we concluded that the cross-validation
contributed to the credibility of the results obtained with the
generic RA tools.
Further validation of generic RA tools could be achieved
by comparing their outcome for a specific risk question with
results from bespoke models that were specifically developed
to address this risk question. Although several bespoke models
were developed for ASF in recent years (26–31), results of these
models could not be used directly for comparison purposes
as they addressed the ASF incursion risk for different years
and/or countries than we did. Updating, re-parameterizing and
re-running these models for the ASF case study was beyond
the scope of this study. Two bespoke models were, however,
developed that addressed the same risk question as the generic
RA tools, one model assessing the probability of a first ASF
infection in a new territory resulting from trade in live animals
and the other model assessing the probability of entry of ASF
virus in a new territory due to wild boar movements (63).
Both models were parameterized to assess the ASF risk to
the Netherlands and Finland in the 2017 situation and for
the two hypothetical scenarios with ASF present in Germany.
Results for trade in live animals indicated a higher risk to the
Netherlands than Finland in the baseline scenario, with the
calculated relative risk being in the same order of magnitude as
those of the generic RA tools (Supplementary Material 4). The
bespoke model for trade in live animals predicted an increased
risk only to the Netherlands for HS2, i.e., when ASF cases were
also reported in domestic pigs, with a calculated relative risk
just above 1 if compared to the baseline scenario. Again, this
is in agreement with the results from the generic RA tools
(Supplementary Material 4). Results of the bespoke model for
the wild boar pathway indicated an equally negligible risk to the
Netherlands and Finland in the baseline scenario. In HS1, the risk
of this pathway was increased to the Netherlands with no further
increase in HS2. The hypothetical scenarios did not result in an
increased risk to Finland for the wild boar pathway. These results
are in agreement with results from the generic RA tools, with
none of them predicting an increased risk to Finland for the wild
boar pathway under the hypothetical scenarios and all of them
but one predicting an equally increased risk under HS1 and HS2
to the Netherlands (Supplementary Material 4).
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Application of the tools for a prolonged period might create
an opportunity for external validation using field data. Some
of the generic tools have been up and running for at least 5
years now. IDM was first released in 2011 and has intensively
been used in the UK by Defra and the Scottish Government’s
Center of Expertise on Animal Disease Outbreaks (EPIC) to
prioritize their risk levels for incursion of disease at different
times of the year. SVARRA was first used in 2013 and has been
used for several rapid risk assessments including ASF, BT, LSD,
and avian influenza (AI). However, one of the difficulties in
validating models evaluating the incursion risk of exotic diseases
is that the adverse events being modeled have a low probability
of occurrence resulting in too few data points for validation, even
when used for a prolonged period.
Model Uncertainty
This study clearly illustrates the impact of model uncertainty on
risk assessment results. Although the generic RA tools agreed
on the direction of the relative risk of ASF to the Netherlands
and Finland, the magnitudes of these relative risks varied largely,
especially for the live animal trade and wild boar pathways. The
range of results obtained when considering the results of all
generic RA tools could be interpreted as an indication of the
uncertainty included in the risk estimates. The results of the
bespoke models fell well within this uncertainty range.
Several methods exist to combine the results of different
models that predict similar metrics, such as ensemble modeling,
structured decision making and model averaging (64). Although
widely applied in, for example, weather prediction (65), ensemble
modeling is still at its infancy in veterinary epidemiology (64, 66).
Methods like structured decisionmaking and ensemblemodeling
can only be applied to models that produce similar metrics
to compare results accross models. It was thus not possible to
combine the model outputs of the generic RA tools involved in
this study to produce an uncertainty distribution of the modeled
ASF risk as output parameters represented different endpoints,
varied from qualitative to quantitative, and were expressed in
different units. To make an integrated risk estimate from the
generic RA tools possible, output parameters would need to be
harmonized first. A further impediment to the integration of
risk estimates obtained by the generic RA tools is the difference
in pathways evaluated by each of the tools. Nevertheless, a
mere comparison of results of different tools can already be
helpful in obtaining a more complete picture of the risk and the
uncertainties involved as illustrated by this study.
The choice for one or more generic RA tools to answer a
specific risk question will depend on the primary objective of
the risk assessment, the diseases and pathways that need to be
evaluated, the resources and expertise available, and the timescale
at which the risk assessment has to be completed (see Tables 1,
2 and Supplementary Material 5). Some of the tools allow for
a rapid risk assessment in response to a new disease event
(NORA, SVARRA), whereas others can be used for a continuous
assessment of incursion risks over time making them suitable for
horizon scanning (SPARE, COMPARE, RRAT, IDM). The latter
tools could, for instance, be used to monitor the incursion risk
of ASF for a specific target area by comparing results obtained
for previous years with the current situation. Some of the tools
come with a prefilled database for specific diseases and pathways
and can easily be used to perform updates of risk assessments
for these diseases (SPARE, COMPARE, RRAT, IDM), whereas
other tools do not come with an underlying database and have
to be filled by the risk assessor (MINTRISK, NORA, SVARRA).
For these tools, disease expertise is a prerequisite to perform
the risk assessment, whereas some of the prefilled tools mainly
require computing expertise. Generally speaking, SVARRA and
MINTRISK are most flexible as to which pathways and diseases
to include. SVARRA is very well-suited for rapid risk assessments
in response to disease events such as the incursion risk of ASF
in wild boar in Belgium in September 2018 (2). MINTRISK was
primarily developed to evaluate the incursion risk of vector-
borne diseases. Although ASF can be transmitted by soft ticks of
the genus Ornithodoros, these vectors do not seem to play a role
in ASF virus transmission in Europe (23). Hence, MINTRISK
is not a preferred tool to evaluate the risk of ASF. Some of the
generic RA tools can rapidly assess the risk of multiple diseases
for a target area given the diseases have been included in the
tool (SPARE, COMPARE, RRAT, IDM). Results of these tools
can be used to evaluate the relative risk of ASF compared to the
risk of other notifiable diseases that might threaten the target
area on a regular basis. Most of the generic RA tools can break
down results to providemore detail on source areas and pathways
contributing most to the risk or to indicate regions in the target
area most at risk of incursion of a new disease, all of which
is essential information for disease prevention and surveillance
purposes. Communication of results from generic RA tools to
risk managers should therefore aim at a proper understanding of
the risks and the uncertainties involved by indicating underlying
mechanisms rather than at communicating the absolute value or
level of risk predicted.
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